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CHAPTER 13

The Decisive Moment
The Science of Decision Making
under Stress
Joseph W. Pfeifer and James L. Merlo

I

n January 2009, US Airways Flight 1549 performed an emergency landing in the Hudson River after hitting a flock of birds and losing thrust in
all engines. Decisions made by the pilot not to return to the airport of the
flight's origin or to attempt to land at surrounding airports, but instead to
bring the aircraft down in the icy cold waters between New York City and New
Jersey, saved all 155 people on board. A few years earlier, on September 11,
2001, another plane had flown down the Hudson River, this time intentionally
crashing into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Seventeen minutes
later, hijackers flew a second plane into the upper floors of the South Tower.
On that fateful morning, there were two other deliberate plane crashes, one
into the Pentagon and the other into a field in Pennsylvania. People around
the world watched intently as firefighters and other emergency responders
made critical decisions in their efforts to rescue some 20,000 people thought to
have been in the towers that day. Subsequently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, military commanders made life and death decisions on battlefields. Through the
use of mass media, people around the world are often eyewitnesses in near
real time to the decisive moment when leadership is on the line and critical
decisions are made to adapt to the danger of extreme events. Those watching
the decision makers have infinite time to second-guess after the fact, free of
the stress and personal drama that surround these decisions.
Many who operate and lead in dangerous contexts have stories of decisive moments of exercising their leadership. The in extremis (dangerous) core of
decision making, however, is one of the least studied elements of the human
230
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dimension. 1 The physical realities of professionals undertaking decisions in
dangerous contexts, like firefighting and military operations, make this one of
the most difficult environments for the application of science. Few researchers have endured the risk or unpredictability of studying human processes in
the presence of danger, preferring instead less meaningful post hoc strategies.
Nonetheless, understanding decision making in dynamic, complex situations
where people's lives are at stake provides important insights into leadership in
dangerous contexts.
Part of decision making involves when to employ which method to
increase the odds of succeeding when leading in a dangerous context. To
demystify this process, decision-making research will be applied here to personal experiences while peering inside the World Trade Center on September
11, visiting the battlefield, and going inside a cockpit during an emergency
landing to see what it is like to make decisions when it counts the most.
Examining the decisive moments for firefighters, soldiers, and airline pilots
provides unique insight into how decisions are made under the stress and
pressure of extreme events. Knowledge gained about decision making in dangerous environments can be applied to a broad range of businesses, governmental and nongovernmental services, or wherever leadership is expected to
make critical decisions in a crisis.

THE ELEMENTS OF COMMAND AND DECISION MAKING
Extreme events require leaders to make critical decisions under a haze of
uncertainty and perform complex organizational tasks, usually under tremendous stress. These leaders are asked to act decisively, yet remain flexible to a
changing threat environment. The actual unpacking of decision making is a
monumental task because researchers define the term in different ways, such
as in relation to strategic thinking, psychology, neuroscience, and so on. In the
nineteenth century, the military strategist Carl von Oausewitz wrote that during pre-battle evaluations, great commanders, such as Napoleon Bonaparte,
saw how to win a battle in a" glance." Oausewitz uses the French expression
coup d'oeil, which he describes as "the rapid discovery of a truth that to the
ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long examination and reflection."2This "glance"is the moment during which commanders make sense of a situation and quickly envision a plausible course of action.
Having this capability is the first element of command.
The second element of command is having the resolve to carry through
with one's strategic intuition despite surrounding uncertainty. A simple plan
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vigorously executed in a timely manner is almost always better than a complicated plan performed too late,3 The third element is having the "presence
of mind" not to ignore uncertainty but to remain flexible to the unexpected,
which may require analytical thinking. Clausewitz discovered that great commanders first see what needs to be done and then resolve to follow their
insights while adapting to the unexpected. These three elements of command
are also seen today during emergency and military operations. Examples of
the three elements can be seen in the actions of firefighters in New York City
following the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11.
On September 11, 2001, at 8:46 a.m., while operating in the street at a gas
emergency in Lower Manhattan, a group of firefighters heard the roar of
a low-flying commercial airliner accelerating as it flew down the Hudson
River. Suddenly, the plane appeared, then aimed and crashed into the
North Tower of the World Trade Center. No one could believe that on a
perfectly clear day, a plane would crash into New York's tallest building. In
an instant we knew that we were going to the biggest fire of our lives. I
remembered trying to comprehend what took place and at the same time
take command. My first order was a direct command: "Go to the World
Trade Center." This was followed by a brief description on fire dispatch
radio that a plane has crashed into the World Trade Center and to transmit a second alarm. Based on past experience at major fires, I knew I had to
give concise orders to maintain command and control. These orders were
given almost automatically; within seconds of impact and without fully
understanding the magnitude of the event. Without hesitation, firefighters immediately mounted their fire trucks. With flashing lights and blasting
sirens, we raced to the World Trade Center. The fire and the smoke coming
from the upper floors of the World Trade Center fit the pattem of a highrise building fire. But this was no routine fire.
The World Trade Center attack was a novel and complex event. Never
before had a commercial plane deliberately crashed into a modem skyscraper. It did not match anything from our firefighting experience and
was quit different from the accounts of a much smaller military B-25 plane
crashing into the Empire State Building on July 28,1945. As we responded
to the World Trade Center, I remember telling myself that I had to slow
my thoughts down and deliberately think of what I had to do next. There
were tens of thousands of people that needed to be evacuated or rescued. I
forced myself to remain calm.
Within a minute of my first radio transmission, I gave additional orders
very precisely and deliberately over the Manhattan fire dispatch radio:
"Battalion One to Manhattan, we have a number of floors on fire. It looked
like the plane was aiming for the building. Transmit a third alarm. Have the
second alarm report to the North Tower and have the third alarm stage at
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Vesey and West Street." This message began with an intuitive statement of
the plane aiming for the building, denoting a terrorist attack, and an analytical order envisioning the initial resources needed and where to deploy
these units. Over the next 100 minutes after this transmission, dramatic
events of rescue and building collapse unfolded rapidly requiring critical
decisions that combined intuition and analysis.
In a crisis, leaders are expected to not only use intuitive, gut feelings but also
to apply rational thinking when making critical decisions. Each mode of decision making uses different parts of the brain, with one mode outperforming
the other depending on the task that needs to be accomplished. The key to
good decision making in dangerous situations is knowing when to rely on
which mode of thinking and when to use both. The battlefield is replete with
examples of commanders constantly switching from one mode to another or
sometimes applying a hybrid approach. For example, on April 5, 2003, less
than two weeks after ground forces started moving north into the country of
Iraq, U.S. military forces conducted raids through the center of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. Three battalions, fewer than a thousand combat soldiers, had
launched an aggressive thrust of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles
into the heart of the city, and in three days of bloody combat ended the initial
phases of the Iraq War. The surprise assault on Baghdad, spearheaded by the
Spartan Brigade commander, Colonel David Perkins, who led the 2nd Brigade
of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), is an illustration of one leader's
intuition that a single armored brigade would be able to successfully penetrate
and literally capture a city defended by one of the world's largest armies.
Using a combination of intuition (I have sufficient combat strength to
accomplish the mission) and analytical thinking (my logistics can support this
initiative), Perkins declared on April 7,"If I can spend a night in Baghdad, then
this war is over." Organized resistance by defenders of the regime of Saddam
Hussein essentially ended after this commander's bold action. Thus, a decision
by a commander on the ground potentially saved lives by ending the immediate armed resistance. Some of the highest officers in the U.S. military command found out about Perkins' tactical exploitation of the enemy only after
seeing media coverage of it. The operation exceeded their expectations. The
critical combination of intuition and analytical thinking were paramount. The
decisive moment in dangerous situations requires the ability to switch and
combine the different modes of thinking.4
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INTUITIVE THINKING VERSUS ANALYTICAL THINKING
The most widely accepted rational model for decision making derives from the
work of 1. 1. Janis and 1. Mann, who define decision making as a process of
comparing a range of options, evaluating them, reexamining their positive and
negative consequences, rating them, and then determining the best option.s
The difficulty is that rational decision making has limited application in a dangerous situation, where leaders are forced to act quickly and without comprehensive information. Rational decision making works well with simple events
or even complicated ones when there is sufficient time to analyze and compare the facts; this, however, is not how firefighters, soldiers, or pilots operate
at the scene of complex or dangerous incidents, where fire or bullets are flying
or a plane has no power. Those confronted with such situations depend heavily upon their intuition in deciding what actions to take. Yet, analytical decision
making is also called upon during emergencies to craft creative solutions for
novel events. Problems might arise from a lack of guidance regarding when
best to use intuition and when to switch to rational analysis. To fully comprehend decision making, one should examine research on it in the psychology
and neuroscience literature.
The psychologist Gary Klein has done extensive research on the decision
making of firefighters and combat soldiers. Based on his analysis, they make
decisions by using cues to recognize a situation as typical (or atypical) and to
decide a course of action by relating it to their experience. 6 Developing a quick
course of action benefits from pattern matching and envisioning how actions
will be carried out while also adapting to the evolving situation. This means
that firefighters and soldiers do not compare all possible options, but choose
the solution most likely to work based on prior experience. 7 These experiences
are rooted in past events or training or are vicariously experienced through
the study of after action reviews and history. If an option is not working, it is
immediately customized or abandoned and a new solution created. This permits firefighters and soldiers to adapt quickly and avoid being paralyzed by
evaluating endless possibilities. These types of decisions are further defined by
A. Dijksterhuis and 1. F. Nordgren as a gut feeling and by the popular writer
Malcolm Gladwell as decisions that occur in"blink."8 Here, researchers believe
that intuition, which is recognizing what to do without fully being conscious
of why one has this knowledge, plays a critical role in decision making.
To explain intuition, J. Lehrer explores the inner working of the brain.
He argues that emotions that trigger intuitive insight occur when the neural transmitter dopamine is released. Dopamine automatically detects subtle patterns based on experiences that are not consciously noticed. 9 The more
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experience and knowledge one has, the more likely a new incident will match
a pattern from the past. Intuition or the emotional brain is especially useful in
making immediate decisions in life-threatening situations. It is the supercomputer of the brain, rapidly scanning past experience to find relevant information that matches the current condition. 10
Another example of high-stakes decision making with lives on the line
occurred on January 15, 2009. After taking off from New York's LaGuardia
Airport, US Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of geese, which caused the
plane to lose thrust in both engines. Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger
radioed a Mayday message, stating that the plane had lost power and was
turning back toward LaGuardia. The air traffic controller suggested runway 13.
Sullenberger "knew intuitively and quickly that the Hudson River might be
[the] only option, and so articulated it." He responded to the controller, saying,"We're unable; we may end up in the Hudson."ll Sullenberger next, however, considered Teterboro Airport, in nearby New Jersey. After being told by
the air traffic controller that he was cleared for an emergency landing on runway 1, Sullenberger said,"We can't do it."Not wanting to believe the gravity of
the situation, the air traffic controller again asked Sullenberger which runway
he would like at Teterboro. Sullenberger immediately replied, "We're gonna be
in the Hudson."
Desperate to come up with another option, the air traffic controller suggested Newark International Airport, which was a few miles away, but the
decision was already made. Captain Sullenberger then narrowed his focus to
concentrating on landing the aircraft in the icy Hudson. The airplane skidded
along the surface of the water and turned slightly left before it came to a stop
near the Intrepid Air and Sea Museum. Sullenberger, realizing that the airplane was in danger of sinking, opened the cockpit door and gave a single
order: "Evacuate./I
During three critical minutes of flight, Captain Sullenberger did not try
to compare all of his options before determining the best choice, but instead
considered one at a time that he thought might work. He later wrote that
there was not enough time to calculate the plane's rate of decent. Instead,
he created a"three-dimensional mental model" of the situation to determine
if his choice could be executedY This type of decision making fits Klein's
recognition-primed decision-making model. As each of Sullenberger's mental simulations failed in his search for the likely option that might work, he
came to realize the best option was the Hudson RiverY Making decisions in
dangerous circumstances requires the intuitive brain to size up the situation
and form the initial impulse about what to do. 14 The analytical brain then can
be used to process the mental simulations to see if the option will work. Pilots
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often refer to the skill to think during a crisis as creating a "deliberate calm,"
which blends intuitive pattern matching with analytical thinking. Analytical
thinking occurs in the prefrontal cortex of the brain. IS It is where calculations
are computed, logical sequences processed, and rational thinking takes place,
This part of the brain also can tum off impulses, which is what Sullenberger
did when he decided not to act on his first thought-to return to LaGuardiabut decided instead to land in the Hudson River.

COMBINING INTUITION AND ANALYSIS TO MANAGE
DANGEROUS SITUATIONS
Intuition is good for matching patterns based on experience, but when someone encounters a novel problem that does not match his or her experience,
and dopamine secretions fail to generate the desired neuronal connections, it
is essential, Lehrer argues, to remain calm and analyze the situation to generate a flash of insight.16
On September 11, 2001, even the smallest decision was the difference
between life and death. As events rapidly evolved, it was essential that emergency responders blend intuition with analytical thinking. Upon arriving at
the World Trade Center, firefighters initiated rescue operations by evacuating people from the buildings and trying to rescue those trapped by the raging inferno. Firefighters carried heavy rescue equipment and self-contained
breathing apparatus as they ascended the narrow stairs. Along the way they
encouraged people not to stop to rest, but to keep moving down the stairs and
to exit the buildings. Little did anyone know that the fires were weakening the
structural integrity of each building, and time was running out.
At 9:59 a.m., we heard a load roar and felt the building rumble. Unbeknown
to us in the North Tower, this was the sound of the collapsing South Tower.
In a fraction of a second, we knew something was seriously wrong and
quickly moved a few meters from the lobby command post to a passageway leading up to a pedestrian walkway over six lanes of traffic on West
Street. This gut feeling or intuition was generated not by knowledge of the
collapsing South Towel~ but by matching the loud roar to the experience
of similar sounds of structural collapse. Immediately we interpreted this
sound as a dangerous condition to us in the lobby and looked for shelter.
This took place within an instant, without any analysis or second thought.
I knew we had to move quickly from where we were standing. Seconds
later, we were covered with choking dust and complete darkness, making
it difficult to breath and impOSSible to see the hand in front of your face .
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Many firefighters, without consciously understanding what was taking
place, made this intuitive decision, which saved them from being killed by
flying debris. J. LeDoux proffers that intuition or gut feeling buys time while
rational thought searches for a solution to a novel eventY In the example
above, instead of spending time analyzing what was happening, the intuitive
part of the firefighters'brains quickly processed information and came up with
the idea to leave the lobby. Firefighters and soldiers often use this type of decision making in times of danger. Klein also suggests that intuition precedes
analysis.I S People with expertise know what to look for when sampling environmental stimuli. 1. Shattuck, J. Merlo, and J. Graham found that more experienced military leaders, based on time in service and rank, tend to ask for less
information when making decisions than do officers with less experience. 19
Their study of military leaders' decision making, which they termed "cognitive integration," suggests that experienced leaders' intuition allows them to
sample a small number of sources, ignoring those they deem not worthy of
consideration. Less-experienced officers sample all sources of information
available and usually as much of each as allowed. 20
Switching from intuitive thought to rational analysis is even more difficult
under dangerous and high-stress conditions. Immediately after the loud
rumbling stopped Oater we learned the sound was from crashing steel
and concrete), some of the Chiefs continued to use their intuition to issue
orders that "we have to get out of here." Certainly, this was a good idea
and a major concern when you do not know how to get out of the building. But this was a building that I was very familiar with and I had been
to hundreds of times. Even in total darkness I had a good idea on how to
get out. My experience and knowledge of the World Trade Center complex
allowed me a few seconds to switch my thinking from intuition to analyze.
Here I was able to focus on the next most important action to take, besides
our own escape. It was clear that if we could no longer command from
the lobby of the North Tower (Tower I), we had to withdraw the firefighters from the building. I depressed the transmission button on my portable
radio and gave the following firm order, "Command to all units in Tower I,
evacuate the building."21

While this may sound like an obvious decision for those watching broadcasts of events on September 11, it was not that obvious for those at the World
Trade Center who did not have the same information, that is, that the South
Tower had collapsed. Those in command at the North Tower had to overcome cognitive biases to continue rescue operations and instead to make a
decision that had never been made in the history of the New York City Fire
Department-abandon a burning building with hundreds of people still
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trapped inside. The novelty of the 9/11 attacks did not allow the firefighters
to match their experience to past patterns of commanding and follow standard procedures. Instead, it forced them to become creative in the decisions
they made. A. Howitt and H. Leonard note that emergency responders need
to improvise when confronted with novel events. 22 Many of the people that
were saved on September 11 owe their lives to improvisational thinking.
Lehrer points out that emotions are adept at finding patterns based on
experience, but when someone encounters an event never before experienced, he or she needs to deliberately analyze the situation to devise innovative solutions.23 On 9/11, instead of responding to the gut feeling to get out
of the North Tower, the firefighters there concentrated on continuing to command. The prefrontal cortex is uniquely designed to manage emotions, filter out extraneous information, and search for creative solutions to complex
problems. Switching from intuitive to analytical thinking allowed emergency
responders to focus on commanding, which led to the flash of insight to evacuate firefighters from the North Tower.
In immediately dangerous contexts, people act first and then try to make
sense of the situation. 24 In complex contexts, however, leadership involves
probing first, making sense of the situation, and then responding. 2s Leaders
allow new patterns to emerge. The decision making in the North Tower of the
World Trade Center is an example of this blending of intuition and cognition.
Intuition gave the firefighters the extra seconds needed to conduct more analytical reasoning to adapt to the novelty of the situation.
After giving the evacuation order and finding our way out, we stood under
the north pedestrian bridge over West Street, connecting the World Trade
Center to the World Financial Center. The street was covered with paper
and the air filled with a brownish-gray dust. The Marriott hotel that was
between the North and South Towers was heavily damaged and the incident command post, overseeing command of rescue operations in both
towers, was abandoned. This critical situation with novel sensory information made little sense. Even standing in the street, we never received
word that a nO-story office building just collapsed nor could we see the
collapsed South Tower because of the dust. I remember forcing myself to
comprehend what possibly could have taken place. The more I tried to
analyze the situation, the longer it took to make a decision on what to do
next. Little did we know that the North Tower was about to collapse and
crush the overpass we were standing underneath. My intuition could not
match what I was seeing to any experience and my analysis failed to make
sense of the scene.
Then suddenly, I felt this cold chill running down my spine that this
was a bad place to stand. Immediately, I acted quickly to lead the group
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I was with out from under the pedestrian bridge and north to the comer
of West and Vesey Streets. Key to this decision was the ability to have the
presence of mind to switch between the two modes of thinking and not be
paralyzed by too much analytical thinking.
Adaptability in dangerous contexts requires the ability to oscillate between
intuitive and analytical modes of thinking for decision making.

BARRIERS TO DECISION MAKING
Dangerous conditions demand that personnel who perform in such contexts
prevail over physical, cognitive, and organizational limitations to carry out
their mission. In extreme danger, these limitations become barriers for leaders
to overcome in their decision making.

Physical Limitations
Warriors and emergency responders operate in conditions that can and do
impose significant demands on the senses, limiting the ability to communicate through normal auditory and visual pathways. Noise (e.g., vehicle engines,
power tools and gushing water, weapons fire) and murky conditions (e.g.,
smoke, sandstorms) can hinder the ability to communicate critical information. Under high stress, an attentional narrowing of the senses occurs that can,
for example, reduce one's peripheral vision. 26 This affects perception by the
senses as outlined in the above example of the environmental factors present
at ground zero. These physical challenges make it extremely difficult to scan,
focus, make decisions, and act. Heat, cold, exhaustion, and a host of other
stressors can have debilitating effects on the long-term and working memory.27
Cognitive Limitations
Many military strategists emphasize that the strength needed to win future
wars will be more cognitively based than kinetically based. 28 This assertion
rings true for emergency responders as well. Early tactical decisions made in
the handling of dangerous emergencies will have significant operational-level
effects on outcome. In such situations,leaders will need to overcome their cognitive biases to increase the quality of their decisions when lives are involved.
Decision makers constantly try to make sense of context. M. Endsley
points out that sensemaking is backward focused, finding reasons for past
events, while situation awareness is typically forward looking, projecting what
is likely to happen in order to inform effective decision-making processes. 29
Decision making relies on seeing what has happened and anticipating what

Table 13.1 Common Decision Making and Behavioral Biases
Automation bias

The tendency to trust information provided via electronic information systems over intuition or humans; accepting information
derived from the use of automation as a "best guess" instead of
vigilant information seeking and processing

Bandwagon effect

The tendency to do (or believe) things because other people do,
with the goal of gaining in popularity or being on the winning side

Confirmation bias

The tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that
confirms one's preconceptions or course of action.

Professional
deformation

The tendency to look at things according to the conventions of
one 's profession, ignoring broader points of view

Denial

The tendency to disbelieve or discount an unpleasant fact or
situation

Expectation bias

The tendency to believe or certify results or analysis that agree
with one's expectations of an outcome and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade corresponding weightings for information that
appears to conflict with those expectations

Extreme aversion

The tendency to avoid extremes, being more likely to choose an
option if it is the intermediate choice

Framing effect

The drawing of different conclusions based on how data are
presented

Illusion of control

The tendency to believe that one can control or at least influence
outcomes that one clearly cannot

Information bias

The tendency to seek information even w hen it cannot affect
action

Loss aversion

The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it

Normalcy bias

The tendency to discount novelty and to respond to such events
with only routine procedures

Neglect of probability

The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a
decision under uncertainty

Not invented here

The tendency to ignore that a product or solution already exists
because its source is seen as an adversary

I'"

Reactance
L.

The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants one to do out
of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain one's freedom
of choice

Selective perception

The tendency for expectations to affect perception

Unit bias

The tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item
often resulting in sequential behavior limiting simultaneous tasks

Wishful thinking

The formation of beliefs and making decisions according to what
might be pleasing to imagine instead of by appealing to evidence
or rationality

..............................................................................................................

Zero-risk bias

Preference for reducing a small risk to zero instead of a greater
reduction in a larger risk
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might happen. So, how does an expert process information? Along with
understanding context and noticing information, cues, and data in the environment' or the lack of certain cues, an expert often also has the ability to tune
out unnecessary information. Sometimes leaders can successfully employ
cognitive shortcuts by utilizing heuristics, or rules of thumb. These tactics and
techniques, however, cannot alone be relied upon.
Instructing leaders on the dangers and benefits of types of cognitive
shortcuts or strategies that are used consciously and unconsciously will potentially make a better decision maker, or at least a more informed one, especially
under extreme conditions, when physical and cognitive resources are potentially at their limits. The benefits of shortcuts for decision making are selfevident, for example, deciding which exit of a plane one would choose in an
emergency or formulating an escape route when searching an apartment on
fire . The pitfalls of certain heuristics and biases are, however, well known, from
the framing of decisions to the readiness to use what is available to the mem0ry' or the availability heuristic.3D
Cognitive biases are essentially mental errors caused by simplified
information-processing strategies. It is important to distinguish cognitive bias
from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that
results from one's own self-interest. In other words, a cognitive bias is not necessarily the result of an emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather of subconscious mental procedures for processing
information. 31 One of the ways to avoid the pitfalls and shortcomings associated with cognitive heuristics and biases is to be aware of them and to use
simulations to practice overcoming them. Table 1 lists some common decisionmaking and behavioral biases of which all decision makers should be aware.

Organizational Limitations
While cognitive bias may blind individuals to emerging threats, organizational factors may prevent the integration of information until it is too late.32
As events move from routine to complex, emergency responders and members of the military tend to "segregate" functional tasks. What was once a convenient division of labor mutates into specialized fiefdoms, with little contact
or communication between people performing one task and those performing
another.33 This separation creates organizational blind spots in decision making. There is a natural tendency for people with similar backgrounds to form
homogeneous groups and provide more information to members of their own
group and less to members outside the group. The organizational behavior of
separating and providing information only within a certain group is known
as organizational bias. 34 In some businesses, such behavior is necessary for
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maintaining a competitive advantage over the competition. In dangerous contexts, however, such behavior potentially limits situational awareness, which
creates barriers for decision making and commanding.
The propensity of similar individuals to migrate to each other is called
homophily.35 Evidence has been found that as the stress and complexity of a
crisis increase, people tend to narrow their focus on aspects they judge to be
most important to them. 36 In extreme danger, they often feel little obligation to
share valuable information with those outside their group, since responsibility for acting is diffused across the in-group. In most cases, people think that
someone else in their organization will share the information. In social psychology this concept is referred to as a diffusion of responsibility and is what
often leads to the well-known bystander effect.

NOVELTY AND COMPLEXITY POINTS TO INTERDEPENDENCE
Fire chiefs, military commanders, and airline pilots dominate the examples
cited here, but most professionals who regularly operate in dangerous contexts have the authority and often the experience to deal with critical situations-until perhaps they are faced with novel and complex events. These
events by their very nature are characterized as having interagency dependencies for collaborative intelligence, requiring decisive leadership to overcome
cognitive and organizational biases. A failure to address biases will result in
a lack of situational awareness and poor decision making, which places leaders and managers at a disadvantage in handling crises. During complex and
novel events, incident management does not rest with a single person; rather,
leaders should increase the rate of information exchange and foster collaboration to generate new tactics and ideas. The key issue for decision makers is
often not the ability to acquire more knowledge, but the ability to harness the
knowledge of others.
On May I, 2010, emergency responders had to overcome cognitive and
organizational biases when they were called to a possible vehicle fire in New
York's Tunes Square. When firefighters arrived, they noticed that something
"did not seem right."The owner of the SUV was nowhere to be found, and
there was white smoke coming from the car rather than black smoke. A handheld thermal camera showed no sign of fire, and an odor of fireworks emanated from the rear of the vehicle. Firefighters exchanged this information with
police and asked them to run the license plates. The plates did not match the
car. The fire lieutenant had to quickly process all these pieces of information.
It would have been easy for the lieutenant to have fallen victim to a number of cognitive biases and treat the incident as a routine car fire. Instead, he
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concluded that they had a car bomb on their hands. He avoided organizational bias by collaborating with police throughout the process, which led to a
decision to evacuate people from the area. Combining intuition with analysis
and overcoming biases to recognize interdependencies of information were
critical for safety. It was later determined that the SUV had the potential to be
a lethal bomb.

IMPROVING DECISION MAKING
An ongoing effort exists to find technological answers to address the physical
dangers, cognitive puzzles, and organizational challenges that push leaders to
their limits. The New York City Fire Department has developed an electronic
command board (ECB) system to assist chiefs in decision making at fires and
emergencies. ECBs are touch-screen computers for a network that displays
such information as unit deployment, emergency distress signals, and digital
blueprints of floors and other building information. Large (32-inch) ECB displays are used for major fires, but there are also smaller (IO-inch) tablets, both
of which graphically present essential information for decision making. As an
incident increases in complexity, incident commanders are forced to remember dozens of unit names and locations within a building, while still managing the fire (or fires). Trying to manage too much information can overload the
brain's working memory, adding to the stress of command and limiting one's
ability to concentrate on critical aspects of incident management. The ECB
frees the brain from memorizing facts by displaying them in easy-to-grasp
pictures. This prevents chiefs from being overwhelmed by information occupying valuable cognitive space, and instead to concentrate on managing the
incident, which requires the brain to blend intuitive and analytical decisions.
ECB is part of a wireless decision-support system that can share information with other first responders at the scene and emergency operation centers elsewhere, thus creating a common operational picture and collaborative
decision -making environment.
The military strategist Clausewitz states that war is influenced primarily
by human beings rather than technology or bureaucracy, although technology
advancements indeed change the tactics, techniques, and procedures used.
Exercising leadership in dangerous contexts is not only about individual decisions, but also about getting others to adapt to a new threat environment. In
extreme events, such as those terrorist attacks, military conflicts, and aviation
emergencies, decision making is an interdependent activity, requiring collaborative intelligence. The challenge is to design a response system able to support and adjust readily to the urgent demands of events.
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Providing decision makers with access to information from within and
outside their agencies that normally would not be available can now be done
through networks. Such networks have the emergent property of the whole
being greater than the sum of its part because of the interaction and interconnection of their members.37 This fact was acknowledged through the
Goldwater Nicholas Act of 1986 and by the 9/11 Commission by requiring and
reiterating that military and emergency responders must operate together in a
unified system to be as effective as possible.
Initiatives are under way to develop means to allow military and emergency responders to accumulate life experiences through the use of virtual
simulations. These simulations should be designed to adapt and respond to
decision makers in an intelligent manner and portray cognitively, culturally,
and intellectually accurate and challenging scenarios focused on identifying,
developing, improving, and assessing intuitive and analytical decision-making
skills. The development of such simulators will provide leaders with the
chance to learn and train through scenarios that replicate life experiences, repetitiously and with low overhead and little risk.
Human factors- the cognitive, cultural, and intellectual aspects of conflict-are proving increasingly to be the vital elements determining success
on the battlefield. It is the proper application of technology to aid the human,
that is, engineered with the human in mind, that will leverage human capabilities and enhance human performance. For example, a well-designed interface that elicits personal interaction could lead to a self-referent memory
approach by a trainee, potentially improving accurate recall when a similar situation arises. 38 This type of interaction with a simulator supports the theory of
recognition-primed decision-making. 39 If properly exploited through interfaces it could promote perceptual learning in the areas of intentional weighting, stimulus imprinting, differentiation, and unitization.40 These facets of
cognitive psychology and learning are addressed in flight simulators, while
military and law enforcement organizations try to do the same with firearm
and gunnery simulators and fire departments with high-rise building fire and
flashover simulators.
While a positive transfer of training is expected from virtual experiences,
a host of other benefits can be realized with a well-made decision trainer.
One can build crisis decision-making proficiencies-the deliberate practicing of skills-using dynamic scenarios for use on tabletops as well as devising full-scale exercises that promote intuitive and analytical decision making
under stress, teaching leaders to blend reason with emotions. These simulators could be used to assist the development of individual and collaborative
decision making.
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Instructional methods for developing expertise must couple new technologies with seasoned experts, allowing simulations to compress experience
into efficient repetition. The simulations should challenge trainees to adapt to
novelty as well as act reflexively based on a strong grounding from what has
happened in the past. Because time will not stop, and junior leaders require
skills immediately upon entering high-risk occupations, it is necessary to
accelerate the development of expertise by forming a cognitive apprenticeship
with leaders recognized as being successful. Effective instructional methods
provide mental schemas, allowing the organization of learning so leaders can
match solutions to past or ongoing problems and create innovative courses
of action for tomorrow's new problems. This type of approach should aim to
improve long-term memory for ready recall in dealing with future extreme situations. Training needs to support guided discovery using the experiences of
veteran leaders and include leaming from errors through naturalistic feedback.
Leaders must be given time to reflect individually as well as collaboratively
with peers and coaches on how to use the two modes of decision making to
adapt to threat environments or crises.

LEADERSHIP IMPLICATIONS
Extreme events require leaders to place people in dangerous situations to corttain and mitigate hazard. Using their understanding of decision making and
behavioral biases, and with the help of simulations and repetitive training,
successful leaders employ a blend of intuition and analytical decision making. Although technology continues to influence decision makers at all levels,
tactics, techniques, and procedures only change as a direct result of the coupling of humans with the technology. The skillful integration of human and
machine results in improved performance, which in the end can save lives.
In stressful situations, leaders overcome ever-changing physical, cognitive, and organizational environments to make critical decisions by producing a deliberate calm. The professionals who make leadership decisions under
such extreme conditions exhibit remarkable fortitude and resilience. Those
who operate in dangerous conditions have chosen a lifestyle that embraces
challenges. They not only aim to survive harsh environments, but they thrive
in them as well. Effective decision making under stress requires a balance
between cognitive intuition and analysis. The stirring stories of 9/11, military
battles in Iraq, and the emergency landing in the Hudson River illustrate the
need to be armed with the knowledge of human cognitive capabilities and the
understanding of strengths and weaknesses of the modes of decision making.
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Decision making in a crisis becomes more difficult with increased complexity
and the need for rapid solutions. Not only will firefighters, military, and pilots
face decisive moments in their careers, executives will also find themselves
making critical leadership decisions in business. Supplementing the individual
decision making skills discussed in this chapter, collaborative decision making is the next inescapable leadership challenge and thus necessitates further
research.
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